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Abstract: On March 11, 2011, a large earth-
quake struck Japan and was followed by a se-
ries of devastating tsunamis. One of these 
tsunamis triggered an explosion at Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. March 11 was a 
natural catastrophe (that civilization failed to 
prevent) on one hand, and a manmade catas-
trophe (that civilization created and made 
worse) on the other. The catastrophe was said 
to be unprecedented and singular. What does it 
mean to speak/write about a singular event? 
How did I / we experience this event? A phe-
nomenological analysis leads us to the complex 
relationship between nature and civilization on 
one hand, and the problem of trauma experi-
ence on the other. A traumatic experience is 
essentially singular, but it can be reproduced in 
language, and even more today with the help of 
(civilization) technology, in visual images that 
can be recorded, reproduced, repeated, and 
sent to far corners of the earth. This reproduci-
bility can help us to integrate the trauma within 
the normal flow of time, but it also conceals 
from us the root of the trauma and the possibil-
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Resumen: El 11 de marzo de 2011, un gran 
terremoto azotó Japón y fue seguido por una 
serie de devastadores tsunamis. Uno de estos 
tsunamis provocó una explosión en la planta de 
Energía Nuclear de Fukushima Daiichi. Lo del 11 
de marzo fue, por un lado, una catástrofe natu-
ral (que la civilización podía evitar) y, por otro 
lado, una catástrofe provocada por el hombre 
(que la civilización ha originado y ha empeora-
do). Se dice que la catástrofe es singular y sin 
precedentes. ¿Qué significa hablar/escribir 
acerca de un acontecimiento singular? ¿Cómo 
experimentamos nosotros este acontecimiento? 
Un análisis fenomenológico nos lleva a la com-
pleja relación entre la naturaleza y la civiliza-
ción, por un lado, y al problema de la experien-
cia de trauma por el otro. Una experiencia 
traumática es esencialmente singular, pero 
puede ser reproducida en lenguaje ─y más hoy 
incluso con la ayuda de la (civilización) tecno-
logía─ en imágenes visuales que se pueden 
grabar, reproducir, repetir y enviar a lejanos 
rincones de la Tierra. Esta reproducción puede 
ayudarnos a integrar el trauma dentro del flujo 
normal del tiempo, pero también ocultarnos la 
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March 11, 2011, was an unforgettable day for Japan.  
At 2:46 p.m., a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck the northeastern coast of 
Honshu, our main island, and was followed by a series of devastating tsunamis 
that ultimately caused meltdowns in three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima 
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Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant only 200 kilometers north of Tokyo. Hundreds of 
kilometers of coastline were devastated on that day and nearly 20,000 people 
lost their lives. Many, many more lost families, friends, homes, communities 
and their livelihoods. In addition to damage from the earthquake and tsunamis, 
a wide area around the power plant was badly contaminated, forcing the evac-
uation of tens of thousands of people aside from those directly hit by the earth-
quake and tsunamis. Even a year after the disaster, more than 300,000 people 
remained unable to return to their homes, industry and infrastructure across 
northeastern Japan were in tatters, the damaged reactors were still unstable, 
and the land around them was seriously ─possibly irreparably─ contaminated. 
Sitting atop the meeting place of four tectonic plates, Japan is accustomed 
to geological disasters. 3/11, however, was more than a natural disaster. It was 
a complex mixture of natural and manmade calamities caused, in part, by a 
byproduct of what we call “civilization”.  
The concept of “civilization” (bunmei 文明) is a fairly recent import to Japan. 
Arriving from the West, the idea of civilization was popularized in Japan toward 
the end of the nineteenth century in the form of a social and political movement 
called bunmei kaika or “awakening of civilization”. “Civilization” in this case 
meant “modernization”, “industrialization” and “technology”, (which Japan did 
not have) and these were the goals that Japan steadfastly and enthusiastically 
pursued over the next century and a half. Accordingly, it was this idea of civili-
zation that was shaken to its foundations by the multiple catastrophes of March 
11. 
Everyone has something to say about what happened that day. One of our 
philosophers remarked that most of the talk is mere yotabanashi: the “talk of 
fools”. Offhand as this may sound, I am inclined to agree with him ─provided 
that we understand “talk of fools” in a specific way. 
By “talk of fools” I do not refer to Gerede or idle chatter. “Talk”, “discus-
sion”, “conversation” ─all of these have to do with language. Language ─the 
word “dog” for example─ can refer to any individual dog, because its “meaning” 
is general (referring to species, genus etc.), universal and repeatable. But how 
does language relate to unique and singular occurrences? Windelband’s text-
book distinction marks a boundary between the natural and historical sciences, 
the former being “nomothetic” (positing general laws) and the latter “idiograph-
ic” (describing concrete and unique events). Idio, of course, is the root of “idi-
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om” and means “peculiar” or “private”. “Idiographic”, being a combination of 
idio and graphic (from graphein ─to “engrave” or “write”), refers to the marking 
down of something that is peculiar, singular and unique, by means of language, 
which is general, universal and repeatable.  
Words like “unprecedented” and “unparalleled” were used with great fre-
quency in describing March 11. It was certainly a day that demanded an idio-
graphic description. But for many of those who experienced the events, the ex-
perience was not so much idiographic as simply unspeakable ─beyond lan-
guage. Not merely particular, but truly singular: without precedence and with-
out parallel, and therefore unspeakable and indescribable by means of lan-
guage. The linguistic description (graphein) of a truly singular (idio) event is a 
contradiction in terms ─contrary to reason and the “talk of fools”─ “a tale told 
by an idiot”.  
I referred above to “those who experienced the events”. But who are they? 
The victims of the disaster? Do they include me? The area where I live was se-
riously affected by liquefaction (where the quaking of the earth turns previously 
solid ground into a sea of mud), and although my home was not badly dam-
aged, the government sent me a “disaster victim certificate”. This puts me at 
the fringe of victimhood, I suppose, although I did not experience March 11 in 
that way. I would not have been able to experience it in any case, since a truly 
singular event cannot be experienced then, or afterward described. 
This paper will be “a tale told by an idiot”. I write it because it seems to me 




1. NATURE AND CIVILIZATION 
 
Nature visited great destruction on us in the form of a huge earthquake and 
tsunami, and our civilization was not strong enough to avert it. Our manmade 
structures ─including the world’s largest seawall─ were easily swept away. The 
brute force of nature, previously hidden from us by the veil of civilization, sud-
denly “appeared” to us in all its nakedness. Or perhaps it was always there to 
see, indirectly, as a trace. It was our knowledge that failed us, by leading us to 
ignore or overlook it. Most people will agree, I think, that we should have seen 
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what we did not. Yet there are some presuppositions behind this statement 
─about seeing and not seeing─ that must be reconsidered. 
 
1. “Appearing” 
Before concerning ourselves with civilization and nature, we need to recon-
sider what it means to “appear”1. Appearance is not merely the result of a 
physical cause-effect relationship. Think of a fish that lives in the water and has 
never been out of it. Does the water “appear” to the fish as “water”? I think not. 
Only when the fish has the misfortune to find itself in the air or on land will the 
water appear to it as water. For something to “appear”, a difference or differen-
tiation is needed. 
The importance of “difference” has been considered common sense since 
the days of structuralism, but I want to emphasize again how necessary differ-
ence is for something to “appear”. Nothing appears in a featureless landscape. 
It is interesting that the starting point for structuralism was language. Since 
ancient Greece, language has been traditionally linked to apophansis (proposi-
tion), which includes the root pha, meaning “light” or “appearing”. Lan-
guage/propositions have the ability to “illuminate” or to “bring to appearance” 
truths, and even falsehoods. Language works by bringing differences into the 
light and thus making them appear. 
Language relates in this way to “appearing” and so does perception. With 
regard to “appearing”, language sits on top of perception so to speak, in a com-
plex relationship of harmony and conflict. Structuralist linguistics focused main-
ly on the structure of difference between linguistic elements (let us call this the 
“horizontal” relationship), but the consideration of “appearance” leads us into 
another dimension ─that of perception─ where the relationship of difference 
expands “vertically” to another level. With regard to “appearance”, the vertical 
relationship is more important than the horizontal one. 
The change in levels can bring about conflict (for example, in the case of a 
falsehood); nevertheless, language and perception influence each other in pro-
ducing “appearance”. We live “between” language and perception, so to speak. 
Language without perception and perception without language are barely imag-
 
 
1 “Appearing” in this case does not refer to “appearing” as opposed to “being”, but to the “appear-
ing” that precedes the dichotomy of “being” and mere “appearance”. In old Japanese, the two are not 
differentiated and to “appear” is to “be”.  
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inable, but even these would be situated at the very limits of the between, 
which is to say, they belong to the between and are not outside it. Each is still 
subject to the influence of the other. The “between” of language and perception 
is the range of their reciprocal and oscillating influence. This “between” is where 
we live. 
Language does not merely copy perception. Something appears to percep-
tion and language makes it appear again, but at another level. A well-cited ex-
ample is the seven-colored rainbow2. Language influences or promotes the way 
things appear to perception, and it also works in another way, by hiding things 
from perception. Observing the movement “between” perception and language, 
we see the two sometimes working together in harmony and continuity to pro-
mote an appearance, and sometimes against each other, in conflict and discon-
tinuity. This ambivalence makes it possible for language to sometimes work 
beyond perception to bring about the appearance of something new. 
The same relationship holds between civilization and nature. Civilization il-
luminates certain aspects of nature, but it suppresses and conceals others. 
Terms like “ecological” and “carbon dioxide emission reduction” seemingly place 
civilization in harmony with nature, but they conceal something else. On March 
11, a concealed (or forgotten) aspect of nature appeared to us as an extreme 
force that was hostile to civilization. Soon afterwards, civilization showed itself 
as a different kind of extreme and hostile force. 
 
2. Perception and language 
The Japanese word for “civilization” ─bunmei 文明─ originally came to us 
from ancient China as a term indicating enlightenment (明) through the writings 
(文) of Confucius. In the nineteenth century, the same expression was used to 
translate the Western concept of civilization, which at that time was linked to 
French enlightenment philosophy and nineteenth-century European ideals of 
social refinement and modern comfort. It functioned as an ideology, and in this 
sense, tended to conceal certain aspects of reality. Concealment, however, 
should not be equated with falsehood. Language that makes too many false 
claims loses its power. Powerful words and concepts are those that make specif-
ic aspects of reality “appear,” even as they conceal others. This is the essence 
 
 
2 Cfr. the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which we will not discuss here. 
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of the power of language. 
The power of language over perception can be summarized in three points. 
(There is a fourth, which I will bring up later.) 
First, language can illuminate specific events of perception and make them 
“appear”. This power seems almost magical from the rationalistic outlook of 
modern science, but the power of civilization is related to this power. 
Secondly, there is already a difference, and therefore a conflict, between 
perception and what is illuminated by language. This is the narrative power of 
language. The relationship between language and perception is not a simple 
one of agreement or disagreement. 
Thirdly, whatever can be expressed by language, language can make ap-
pear. 




Kant’s theory focused on the influence that language has on appearance. 
One of his most famous theses is: “Thoughts without content are empty, intui-
tions without concepts are blind”3, “concepts” indicating language (or catego-
ries) in this case, while “intuitions” are what is given by sensation or perception. 
In Kant, the latter do not have a linguistic structure. Phenomena (appearances) 
are possible only when the two work together. Language provides only the form 
and does not influence the content of the intuition as it does in the Sapir-Whorf 
theory of the way we see a seven-colored rainbow. Nevertheless, the influence 
of concepts (language) is decisive in the following way: 
Kant draws a stern line between “intuitions” (sensation) and “concepts” 
(understanding). Sensation provides only a disjointed and un-unified “mani-
fold”4, whereas the understanding has not only language (categories), but the 
ability to integrate or synthesize5. It takes the disjointed manifold given by sen-
sation and joins them (strictly speaking, through the mediation of a “schema”), 
making the appearance of a unified phenomenon possible. This is the decisive 
 
 
3 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (hereafter KrV), Hamburg, Meiner, 1998, B p. 75. 
4 The idea that the senses give us only bits and pieces is actually quite astonishing.  
5 “Die Verbindung (conjunctio) eines Mannigfaltigen überhaupt, kann niemals durch Sinne in uns 
kommen […]. So ist alle Verbindung […] eine Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der allgemeinen 
Benennung Synthesis belegen würden […]” (KrV B, p. 129). 
TRAUMA, CIVILIZATION, REPRODUCTION 297 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, n. 9, 2012. 297 
 
point. Without the understanding (that is, language), the impressions provided 
by sensation fall apart and there is no “experience”.  
In addition to this, Kant recognizes another unifying function: that of the “I”. 
If the understanding already has that function, why is the “I” necessary? This is 
a question we will come back to. 
All of the above belongs to the realm of the “transcendental”, by which Kant 
means that they precede experience and make it possible. Now, the events of 
March 11 would seemingly be integrated within this framework as an experi-
ence. But were they?  
 
2.2. Husserl 
Husserl was critical of Kant’s separation of concepts and understanding 
(language) from intuitions and sensation (perception). For Husserl, intuitions 
included “categorical intuitions,” which are intuitions with a linguistic structure. 
He went even further in regarding perception (experience) as the foundation of 
language. The latter arises from the former. This refutes the Kantian idea that 
integration and synthesis are achieved only by the understanding. A “passive 
synthesis” is already at work in intuition (perception), said Husserl. This was a 
very important insight on his part.  
What then of the influence of language on perception? Husserl probably 
would not have recognized any influence on the formal aspects of language, 
such as its grammar and logical structure. However, with regard to the content 
─the meaning─ of language, he does recognize its influence, at least indirectly, 
in his discussion of the effect of astronomical science on perception6. A specific 
example is the way we see the stars of the skies: the meanings of our percep-
tions change when we see them as solar and stellar eclipses, comets and mete-
ors ─that is, as astronomical phenomena. This change is brought about by the 
language of astronomy. 
Is there such a thing as a perception that is completely untouched by lan-
guage? This question can be answered only in a roundabout way. To answer it 
directly (in the affirmative), we would have to confirm the existence of a per-
ception that is completely cut off from language. To put it another way, we 
 
 
6 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana (hereafter Hua) (Martinus Nijhoff), Vol. IX, p. 57. In a serious con-
sideration of the history of meanings, it would be further necessary to distinguish between sedimenta-
tion and reactivation, and forgetfulness and recollection with regard to this influence.  
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would have to excavate an untouched and buried perception and make it ap-
pear to us. Phenomenology claims to undertake an “archaeology” of sorts that 
begins on the surface of the Here and Now and digs down to what is buried un-
derneath. But how can it do this without contaminating the untouched with 
something from the surface (such as language)?7.  
What is an “untouched” perception? Is it a Kantian intuition, made up of 
disjointed sensual impressions? Phenomenology does not recognize such a 
thing8. It is probably something closer to the perception of a young child, but 
pursuing this possibility immediately leads to the morass of psychological mis-
conceptions. What exactly is a “young child”? How old is that child? Old enough 
to speak a language? Or is it a newborn infant? Should we rely on child psy-
chologists ─or possibly animal psychologists─ and their precise instruments of 
observation and measurement for the necessary data about such perceptions? 
No ─because this way of thinking is based on a misconception of the phenome-
nological method. 
Husserl was indeed trying to excavate pre-linguistic perception, but he was 
not pursuing a perception that can be observed from without (such as the per-
ception of a pre-linguistic child). Observation from the outside has been sus-
pended (epochéed) at the beginning of the phenomenological procedure (the 
transcendental reduction). What Husserl pursues is a reflective perception of 
the “I”. More precisely, he was trying to describe, from within the I, how its 
perception comes to be. Thus, what we reach after digging down into the ge-
netic structure of the I is still an I ─a “primal” I.  
Husserl excavated the experience of the I through reflection. Through re-
flection, he discovered that language is founded on perception, but that the 
meanings of language also influence perception. There is a movement between 
language and perception; that place “in between” is where phenomenology op-
erates. Thus, for phenomenology, the idea of a completely untouched percep-
tion is a distortion born of scientism (which is based on the idea that one can 




7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the “silent cogito” and “spoken cogito” relate to this prob-
lem.  
8 Some scholars regard Husserl’s hyle as corresponding to this, but I think Husserl’s analyses of the 
passive synthesis indicate otherwise.  
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3. Civilization and writing  
The relationship between language and perception is repeated, even more 
dynamically (although with some differences), between civilization and nature. 
Both nature and civilization lie within the range of their reciprocal and oscillat-
ing influence. Nature lies at the foundation of civilization, but civilization can 
also influence nature. 
 The East Asian term for “civilization” is文明 and is shared by the Japanese, 
Chinese and Koreans, although the term is pronounced differently in each coun-
try. 文 means “writing” and points to the importance of writing for civilization. 
Writing (in comparison to oral language) adds to the power of language to pre-
serve and to repeat. Preserved (recorded) words can be retrieved and repeated 
at will. If we recall Husserl’s assertion that ideal objects, like those of geometry, 
are transmitted primarily through writing, we see that writing is also an im-
portant theme for phenomenology9. 
Civilization ─like language─ constrains perception to a degree, but it also 
liberates, in the sense that it brings to appearance certain things that could not 
appear without its help. Furthermore, those of us who have been marked and 
taught by civilization are able to use its powers to create new appearances, 
which in their turn lead to the next. Civilization breeds appearances, which 
breed appearances of their own. 
 
 
2. WHAT DID WE EXPERIENCE ON MARCH 11? 
 
Let us go back to the question: What did we experience on March 11? This 
is a question that could be answered from the viewpoint of a cultural or intellec-
tual history. For example, the Great Lisbon Earthquake is said to have had a 
wide-ranging effect on the intellectual development of Europe. The effects of 
March 11 will no doubt be studied in the same way, from an objective outside 
viewpoint. But here, I want to look at the event from within ─and therefore, 
from within our own civilization─ to ask again: What was it? 
March 11 was called an “unprecedented” disaster. “Unprecedented” means 
 
 
9 This does not mean that oral language cannot found a civilization. Nevertheless, there is an im-
portant link between writing and civilization.  
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that it never happened before, that it was incomparable, that it was truly singu-
lar. But this singular occurrence was experienced all over the world in the form 
of visual images. Our modern civilization (technology) has made it possible to 
send images to faraway places in the blink of an eye. 
Visuals of the earthquake showed airport ceilings falling apart and streets 
turning into rivers of mud. The earthquake came so suddenly that there were 
not many visual recordings, but people had more warning before the tsunamis: 
the terrifying waves were recorded in many places, by many people. They were 
shown and seen by many, many more. We all saw houses being crushed and 
swept away, and watched people being taken by the waves. The “singular” 
event was witnessed by countless people, simultaneously. Repeatedly.  
“Universal” is one antonym for “singular,” but “reproducible” is another. 
With regard to language, written words are particularly favorable to reproduc-
tion. In Europe after Gutenberg, the reproducibility became remarkable. There 
is a difference between universality and reproducibility in that the former is ide-
al and the latter is real, but they have much in common in their contrast to sin-
gularity.  
Let us refer here to Walter Benjamin’s theory of art. According to Benjamin, 
the unique artworks of former times were accompanied by an “aura”, which 
copies and reproductions do not have. To the contrary, reproductions are “a 
relentless destruction of the aura of their creation”10, he writes. Benjamin re-
garded cinematic films as being representative of this loss of aura. 
The video images of March 11 were not cinema, but live broadcasts. Never-
theless, they were recorded, edited, copied and replayed, to be seen again and 
again on news programs, YouTube, etc. In Benjamin’s time, newsreels shown in 
movie houses corresponded to today’s news programs and he remarked on 
their “repeatability” as a major attribute, but today’s news programs are even 
more so. What most of us “experienced” were repetitions.  
What then of the “singularity” of March 11? Despite the repetition of repro-
duced images, the catastrophe itself was nevertheless singular, I think. However, 
the reason for its singularity was not its irreproducibility, but its frightfulness. It 
was fright that made the event unique.  
 
 
10 Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007, p. 43.  
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3. FRIGHT (SCHRECK) 
 
Freud wrote about “fright” (Schreck). What is it exactly? Let us go back to 
Kant for a moment.  
 
1. “One” and “unique” 
According to Kant, sensation (intuition) provides only a disjointed and un-
unified manifold that is brought together only by the understanding (concepts). 
Both are transcendental functions that precede experience; the latter works by 
integrating data provided by the senses. That would seem enough to form the 
basis of experience, but Kant adds another unifying function, out of prudence or 
perhaps anxiety: the “I” of the transcendental apperception. This I, being tran-
scendental, precedes experience and therefore makes it possible. It is an ulti-
mate defense mechanism, impermeable to the adverse effects of experience on 
the integrity of the ego. 
Husserl, too, after great consideration, recognized in the ego a “centraliz-
ing” function. Kant accords the I a “numerical unity” (numerische Einheit)11, but 
Husserl speaks of its “uniqueness” (Einzigkeit)12 . Or, to be more exact, he 
speaks of the uniqueness of the primal-I, which is the bottommost stratum of 
the I. “Numerical unity” and “uniqueness” are not the same thing. Husserl’s 
“uniqueness” is not a matter of number, but is something that precedes num-
bers and is essentially inexpressible in language. Expressing it in language 
would be no more than an equivocation (Äquivokation)13, he says. In purely 
formal terms, it refers to the uniqueness of the one and only locus of appear-
ance out of which the I cannot step.  
 
 
11 Kant considered the possibility of a numerical multiplicity (i.e. fragmentation or dissociation) of 
the I and asserted its “numerical unity” to counteract that possibility. For Kant, “numbers” issue from 
“time” as a form of the inner sense. Heidegger presented the “I” as arising out of a reflexive circular 
movement of time. This would mean that the numerical unity of the “I” originates transcendentally in 
the “uniqueness” of time. But an I born of such a reflexive and circular movement before experience 
would be closed in upon itself. To be sure, a closed circuit is safe and well defended. Husserl’s concept of 
transcendentality is different (and less safe), where the I is established within the transcendental experi-
ence.  
12 In Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, § 54b 
(Hua VI, p. 188) Husserl refers to the uniqueness of the primal-I. This uniqueness is related to the 
uniqueness of the world (ibidem, § 37, p. 146).  
13 Ibidem, p. 188. 
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Now, does the unique primal-I have the ability to unify and integrate? This 
leads us to another matter that is already implied by the word “primal”: the 
passive synthesis. Husserl saw the passive synthesis at work in the intuition, 
precedent to the (active) synthesis such as that of Kant’s understanding. He 
meant that an elemental synthesis (integration) is already at work in the sub-
stratum of the primal-I. 
The I integrates itself. After this integration, it can be said to be “numerical-
ly one”. However, the “uniqueness” of the primal-I precedes that numerical 
oneness. According to Husserl, the I arises out of that uniqueness by “auto-
affection” (Selbst-affektion) ─a special kind of self stimulation that gives birth 
to the I.14 The I carries on from the passive synthesis, actively developing and 
strengthening it. If the passive synthesis of the primal-I can be referred to as a 
kind of “nature” at work, then we might say that the Husserlian I carries on 
from nature. However, because it is open to nature at its lowest stratum, Hus-
serl’s I is more vulnerable than Kant’s. 
March 11 was an event that damaged the synthesizing function of the I, 
which is the ultimate condition for the possibility of experience. Experience was 
no longer experience, but disjointed events lacking unity. The ego had no words 
for it, could not tell a story. Kant intended the I to be an ultimate defense 
mechanism against disjointed reality, but in the face of catastrophe and fright, 
it sometimes fails the test.  
 
2. Fright and trauma 
Freud observed the phenomenon of fright in patients who had been trau-
matized15, and who suffered from flashbacks and compulsive repetition disor-
ders. When the I is properly in control of the constitution of time, memories can 
be retrieved repeatedly from the past at will, or be left unretrieved, and they 
can be verbalized. But flashback memories assail without warning. They can be 
neither controlled nor verbalized. The I is powerless against them. Repetition is 
 
 
14 The primal-I is both the primal movement and also the place by which and where “appearance” 
takes place, but it is ordinarily concealed deep under the I. It appears only through a very thorough self-
reflection, or when the I is badly damaged. At the same time, it is by grace of its link to the primal-I that 
a damaged I can sometimes revive or heal. But the integrity of the primal I is not rock-solid; it is ele-
mental and thus prone to tiny cracks (primal divisions). It is this delicate balance of integrity and divi-
sion that makes the I possible.  
15 See, for example, Sigmund Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips. Judith Herman, Trauma and Recov-
ery: The Aftermath of Violence, from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, New York, Basic Books, 1992, is 
another classic study of trauma, although the controversy regarding trauma is still ongoing.  
TRAUMA, CIVILIZATION, REPRODUCTION 303 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, n. 9, 2012. 303 
 
normally a reproduction or creation of copies, but repeated flashbacks never 
shed their singularity. The fright is new every time. Freud called events of this 
kind “mnemic traces” or “mnemic fragments”. 
Let us attempt a phenomenological interpretation of these events. The in-
tegrative function of time constitution is called temporalization. Briefly, 
temporalization begins with the immediate retention of an impression (the pri-
mal impression) in the present. This initial holding of a memory prevents it 
from being lost. Successive impressions are successively retained in a chain, 
and this chain is the transitive stage of the temporal perspective. Events along 
the chain can be recalled at will by the I and replayed or reproduced. Repro-
duced time phases along the time chain are joined together to constitute time 
as an integrated and explicit whole. It is only within this integrated time that 
experience can be established as a unity. 
But when trauma occurs, the primal impression of an event is not retained 
and therefore does not join the chain. It does not become part of the flow of 
time. The “transitional synthesis” that joins successive phases into a single 
event also cannot take place. If “memory” is the retention of primal impressions 
within a succession of retentions, the primal impressions of a trauma fail to be 
retained and therefore do not become memories in the proper sense of the 
word. They are lost and cannot be freely recalled. But they have not been truly 
forgotten. They float around like residual ghosts in time, suddenly appearing as 
flashbacks. They have not been forgotten; they cannot be forgotten, because 
they have never been under the control of the ultimate defense mechanism of 
experience: the I. The function of the I to constitute time as an integrated unity 
was damaged at the onset.  
In the preface to this paper, I remarked that March 11 is a tale told by an 
idiot because it was truly singular. However, its singularity does not stem from 
its being unprecedented. The decisive factor was the frightfulness of the catas-
trophe: the frightfulness that prevented the event from joining the flow of time. 
People could only gasp (Ah! Ah!) as the earth shook and the ocean swallowed 
the land. It was an event that stimulated the senses, but could not be properly 
verbalized. And yet, the images were repeated over and over. Words were re-
peated. The first words to be repeated were words with the minimum of univer-
sality: the proper name. The catastrophe goes in Japan by the name of 3.11 
─three numbers in a row that are very much like 9.11 just a decade before. The 
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minimal stuttering of fools that is the starting point for the reverbalization and 
recollection of a failed memory. 
Benjamin mentioned the flashback as a technique of the cinema, and it is 
also interesting that he wrote of it in relation to the unconscious: “We encoun-
ter for the first time unconscious optics through it [the camera], the way we 
encounter unconscious impulses through psychoanalysis.” 16  The civilization 
(technology) that created films was linked in Benjamin’s mind to the trauma 
spoken of by psychoanalysis. As Martin Jay points out, Benjamin was probably 
a trauma victim himself.17 Benjamin, however, refused to find consolation or 
healing in the trappings of modern civilization, since, after all, it was civilization 
that had brought on the trauma in the first place. 
Benjamin was a gifted critic who could step outside civilization in his mind 
in order to analyze it. It was the distance he placed between himself and it that 
gave him the power to indirectly verbalize his own trauma18. For the phenome-
nologist, however, whose point of reference is the way things “appear,” the ver-
balization of trauma is much more difficult. This is because trauma fails to “ap-
pear,” either through memory or through reflection.  
 
 
4. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TRAUMA 
 
Is a phenomenology of trauma impossible then? Are there no phenomenol-
ogists who have personally dealt with trauma? Levinas seems to be one19. 
Levinas is known for his emphasis of the concept of “diachrony,” which points to 
a disjunction along the chain of temporal retentions. There is something hidden 
that ruptures the smooth flow of time. I think this concept is best understood 
when considered in relation to trauma. 
It is first of all retention that prepares the way for the smooth integration of 
time. Retentions are the basic building blocks, linked chain-like to form the uni-
 
 
16 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 41. 
17 Martin Jay, “Against Consolation: Walter Benjamin and the refusal to mourn”, in Jay Winter / 
Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000. 
18 It is not possible to step entirely out of civilization, so Benjamin’s distancing must be seen as rel-
ative. Freud distanced himself from trauma by observing it through a patient, which is why he could talk 
about it.    
19 And possibly Derrida. 
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ty of time. Retention, however, cannot retain forever. Beyond its range, Levinas 
sees memory and historiography at work: “We arrive at memory, which re-
trieves in images what retention cannot keep, and historiography, which recon-
structs that of which the image has been lost. To speak of consciousness is to 
speak of time”20. 
This argument goes beyond Husserl and is reminiscent of Hegelian phe-
nomenology, I think. What is beyond retention is retrieved by memory, and 
what is beyond memory is retrieved by historiography. History in this case is 
primarily a personal history, but it is also linked to our common history, and if 
we consider the French usage of the word histoire, it is also linked to “story-
telling”. The second part of the word, graphy, also takes us back to “writing”.  
Historiography is able to recover the continuity of ruptured experience. The 
power of recorded language and of verbalization is very great. Freud writes of 
curing patients through the verbalization of traumatic events, where they do 
not so much verbalize what they recall, as recall by verbalizing. Writing or 
speaking a story can smooth out the wrinkles in time, soothe the residual 
ghosts of trauma, and place the traumatic event back into the river of time. It 
creates the necessary distance for healing. This is the fourth power of language. 
Historiography can take a truly singular traumatic event and make it retrievable 
and reproducible, and change the incoherence into an experience. Civilization 
has a similar ability to heal wounds through medicine, mourning rites, religion, 
etc. And if trauma is linked to the death drive, the reproductive power of civili-
zation can also suppress that drive. Reproduction functions as a suppression of 
death.  
Yet Levinas, like Benjamin, did not try to conceal or heal trauma, but rather 
to shoulder it and go on with life. Levinas found in trauma, paradoxically, the 
possibility of morality. Holding on to it, he verbalized ─or rather, reverbalized it. 
In Japan, too, during and after the traumatic events of March 11, people 
became very altruistic and acted “for others.” They saw the faces of disaster 
victims and felt themselves accused, felt the need to respond. They became 
subjects (subjected to the victims’ faces) who gave priority to others over 
themselves and actively acted for them. This change, it seems to me, was trig-
 
 
20 Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu‘être ou au-delá d’essence, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publis-
hers, 1991, p. 41. 
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gered because the subject as a unified and integrated self, safe within the con-
fines of a closed system, was deprived of its earlier defenses. March 11 was, in 
a sense, an event in which the truth of Levinas’ argument suddenly became 
explicit. This truth ─a truth rather than a morality, a fact rather than a com-
mand─ is a weighty one.  
But I ask again: what was it that appeared to us on March 11? Nature, 
which is sometimes in harmony with and sometimes in conflict with civilization, 
suddenly appeared to us in an extremely hostile form. Nuclear events followed 
and complicated the matter, since the nuclear power plants were products of 
civilization rather than of nature. The strength of civilization normally lies in its 
ability to excavate and bring into appearance hidden resources such as coal and 
oil and uranium, to draw out the “useful” aspects of nature and to suppress 
other not so favorable aspects with physical devices like dams and levees, and 
sometimes with sophisticated strategies like antibiotics and vaccinations. Civili-
zation/technology is our way of making nature appear in some cases and sup-
pressing it in others, as a means of defending ourselves from traumas. In many 
cases, it succeeds. 
March 11, 2011 was a crisis not only because our most civilized defenses 
from trauma failed us, but even more because civilization itself (as technology) 
caused the greatest trauma of all. March 11 may have shown us one way to 
morality, but leaves us nevertheless with a civilization that traumatizes as well 





Benjamin cited film art as a primary example of technical reproducibility. 
Today, images are reproduced en masse, at a rate and speed unimaginable in 
Benjamin’s day. During and after the events of March 11, which were truly sin-
gular for those who underwent them, images of the events are reproduced, re-
peatedly. They were recorded, edited, broadcast, copied, then recorded, edited 
and broadcast again, over and over.  
Reproductions of this kind can result in long-term exposure to trauma, and 
perhaps trigger symptoms of a posttraumatic disorder. On the other hand, they 
may also weaken and dilute the frightfulness of a singular event. More specifi-
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cally, by juxtaposing images of the catastrophe with those of “similar” catastro-
phes like the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 or the Boxing Day Tsunami of 
2004, they show us that it was not really so unprecedented or unique. Secondly, 
by presenting us with new events like an official declaration that the nuclear 
reactors have been “contained” and showing us images of the reconstruction 
underway, they tell us that the catastrophe was only a temporary state of af-
fairs. Thirdly, by showing us images in chronological order, they encourage us 
to make a “story” out of the chaos. In this way, reproduced and repeated imag-
es play a role in smoothing out the ruptures in time. As such, they have an im-
portant function in modern civilization. Writing was once the most important 
and powerful means of reproduction, but that role seems to have been taken 
over by visual images. This means that we are also in more danger than before 
of being deceived by images and their appearance. 
Is it possible to “embrace” trauma ─to refrain from veiling it under repro-
duced and reproductive narratives? If embracing it means to follow the Jewish 
admonition zakhor (remember), this is a near impossibility for the “I,” since an 
I damaged by trauma loses its power to remember. 
Apparently, we must accept the reproductions of civilization as a means of 
dealing with the trauma we have encountered. At the same time, we must be 
wary of what civilization conceals from us, including its tendency to generate 
new traumas. Benjamin warned that modern civilization has the power to shock. 
That power has greatly increased over the last century.  
Let me end this fool’s tale with the words of another fool who lived in Japan 
eight hundred years ago. He was also witness to a series of calamities, includ-
ing a massive earthquake and tsunami, and responded by writing an essay-
poem that is still taught in schools today: 
 
The flowing river never stops and yet the water never stays the same. 
Foam floats upon the pools, scattering, re-forming, never lingering long. So it is with 
man and all his dwelling places here on earth.21 
Earthquakes and tsunamis have been part of Japanese history for a long time.  
 
Then, as now, people were shocked, devastated, driven to tell stories and 
to philosophize. The poet, Kamo-no-Chomei, meant to warn his readers about 
the powerlessness of humanity against nature. Today, he would have to add 
 
 
21 Kamo-no-Chomei, Hojoki: Visions of a Torn World, Berkeley, Stone Bridge Press, 1996. Trans. 
Yasuhiko Moriguchi / David Jenkins. The original was composed in 1212. 
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another warning against the destructiveness of civilization. Now, perhaps more 
than then, it is necessary to rethink our connections to both nature and civiliza-
tion. 
 
